UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

WILLIAM ALLEN BLOOMFIELD,

V.

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

2:04-cr-441-GEB

TENTATIVE RULINGS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE*

In a filing on August 15, 2005, the government gave notice of its intent "to offer evidence [at trial] of Defendant William Bloomfield's prior crimes, wrongs, and acts." (Notice at 1.) The government argues the proffered evidence is admissible since it is "inextricably intertwined with the charged offense." (Id.) Further, the government contends the proffered evidence is admissible since it is "evidence of intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) [and] demonstrate[s] that the defendant knowingly possessed, received, and distributed material involving the sexual exploitation of minors, to

^{*} These tentative rulings are provided to help the parties focus their oral argument at the hearing scheduled to commence at 10:30 a.m. on September 2, 2005.

Case 2:04-cr-00441-GEB Document 31 Filed 08/31/05 Page 2 of 8

2.5

wit several images and videos identified as child pornography . . . " (Id.)

The government states it intends to offer the following evidence:

During the evening of January 17, 2004, the defendant, his then-wife Kim, his 13 year old stepdaughter "DOE," and his 18 year old son "K.B.," were visiting with relatives. After dinner the conversation turned to a discussion of pedophiles and their treatment. DOE became noticeably upset and left the room. DOE then confided in K.B. that the defendant had been sexually molesting her for three years. K.B. insisted that DOE tell her mother, saying that if she did not, he would.

The next evening, January 18, DOE told her mother that the defendant had been sexually molesting her since October, 2000. Kim immediately took DOE to the police station to report the molestation. She and DOE also collected the computers used by the defendant believing that they might contain evidence because, on two occasions, she had seen child pornography being downloaded by the defendant (October or November, 2000, [2] and November, 2003).

During the initial incidents, Kim confronted the defendant. He told her that he was downloading and collecting the pornography so that he could alert the download service provider to take the files off. She demanded that he delete the images and he told her that he had.

DOE was interviewed twice by law enforcement personnel. She explained that the defendant had been molesting her since she was ten. DOE related that the defendant initiated the molestation in October 2000, telling her that he would teach her about sex. Between October 2000 and approximately December 2003, when she was 13 years old, the defendant had sexual intercourse with DOE numerous times. He also instructed DOE in how to orally copulate him, advising her that it would make her husband happy. He also requested that she perform oral sex on him on numerous occasions. The defendant instructed DOE to keep the molestations a secret because no one would believe her. He also said that she would

never see her grandfather again if she disclosed the molestation.

On one occasion the defendant showed DOE a pornographic movie on the computer. On another occasion DOE discovered the defendant looking at child pornography on the computer. DOE told the defendant that it was illegal, and called him a "sicko," but the defendant explained that he was collecting it for the FBI and sending it to them. $^{[4]}$

[4] DOE described the picture she saw the defendant viewing as a "young girl, 10 years old" without clothes, performing a graphic sexual act.

The government also intends to introduce evidence from DOE's mother [Kim] that on two occasions (October or November, 2000, and November, 2003) she discovered child pornography on the defendant's computer. During the first incident, the defendant insisted that he was gathering evidence to turn it over to the FBI.

(Notice at 2-4.)

2.5

The pornography that DOE states Defendant showed her on two separate occasions on a computer and the child pornography that Kim observed him looking at on a computer, and the communications Defendant had with each of these individuals on those occasions, is admissible since it either concerns the indicted crimes or is inextricably intertwined with the indicted offenses.¹

The government argues that the other proffered evidence in the government's case-in-chief, which for the sake of brevity is characterized as molestation evidence, is inextricably intertwined

Although it is unclear whether one of the occasions described by DOE concerned child or adult pornography, that incident is considered inextricably intertwined with the indicted offenses since she described what she saw in pertinent part as follows: "it was a girl with little bows in her hair and an old guy and they started having sex." (Police Report attached to Notice as 000037.)

with the indicted offenses, indicating that it explains Kim's motivation in taking the computer and DOE to the Sheriff's Department. However, the molestation evidence is not inextricably intertwined with the indicted offenses since Kim's motivation in taking the computers and DOE to the Sheriff's Department "has nothing whatsoever to do with the factual setting of the [crimes] charged in this case." <u>United</u>
States v. Heidebur, 122 F.3d 577, 580 (8th Cir. 1997).

Since the molestation evidence is not inextricably intertwined with the indicted offenses, its admissibility is analyzed under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403.² To be admissible under Rule 404(b), the molestation evidence must be "(1) sufficient . . . for the jury to find that the defendant committed the [molestations]; (2) . . . introduced to prove a material issue in the case; (3) . . . not too remote in time; and (4) if admitted to prove intent, [it must be] similar to the offense charged." <u>United States v. Murillo</u>, 255 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "Once relevance is established, the district court should admit the evidence unless its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its probative value." <u>United States v. Johnson</u>, 132 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1997).

The government argues that the molestation evidence

established through DOE's testimony regarding the molestations, will be offered to prove [Defendant's] knowing and intentional possession and receipt of child pornography. Based upon the nature of the anticipated defenses at trial, the introduction of prior act evidence is critical to establish the defendant's intent to possess images depicting minors in sexually explicit conduct. The evidence also rebuts any claim that the

Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Rules are to the Federal Rules of Evidence.

defendant was merely conducting research for law enforcement. The evidence counters any other general claim that the defendant lacked intent or that an outsider impermissibly used his wireless network to place the images on his computer.

(Notice at 5-6.)

The essence of the government's position is that the molestation evidence concerning Defendant's sexual exploits of DOE, a child victim, demonstrates his sexual interest in children and has probative value on the material issue that he knowingly possessed and that he knowingly received and/or distributed child pornography. The government also argues that admission of the evidence and Kim's response to it - when she turned the computers over to the Sheriff's Department - is "the only way for the jury to assess the defendant's anticipated defenses" because otherwise "the jury will be left to speculate why Kim turned the computers over to the Sheriff's Department." (Id. at 5.) Defendant opposes the government's Rule 404(b) motion, construing the government's argument to state "that such molestations are motive for the possession of the child pornography." (Def.'s Opp'n filed 8/30/05 at 2.)

Even though the molestation evidence has some probative value, it still "'may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . .'" <u>United States v. Merino-</u>Balderrama, 146 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Rule 403).

The Supreme Court has stated that the district courts should balance the probative value of a given evidentiary item against its prejudicial potential in the following way: "On objection, the court would decide whether a particular item of evidence raised a danger of unfair prejudice. If

The government mentioned "motive" when discussing the propositions on which $404\,(b)$ evidence is admissible. (Notice at 5.)

it did, the judge would go on to evaluate the degrees of probative value and unfair prejudice not only for the item in question but for any actually available substitutes as well. If an alternative were found to have substantially the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk."

Id. at 761-62 (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182
(1997)).

It is recognized that:

Parties always introduce evidence that will do damage to the other side's case; that's the very point of a trial. That evidence may decimate an opponent's case is no ground for its exclusion under 403. The rule excludes only evidence where the prejudice is "unfair"-that is, based on something other than its persuasive weight.

<u>United States v. Cruz-Garcia</u>, 344 F.3d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 2003). "As the Advisory Committee Notes to [Rule] 403 explain, unfair prejudice means 'undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.'" <u>United States v. Hankey</u>, 203 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000).

The molestation evidence has the attendant risk of unfair prejudice because it could invoke an adverse emotional response against Defendant. "[0]nce the district court conclude[s] that the [admission of evidence] raise[s] a danger of unfair prejudice, Rule 403 require[s] it critically to 'evaluate the degree of probative value . . not only for the [evidence] in question but for any actually available substitutes as well.'" Merino-Balderrama, 146 F.3d at 762 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 173).

The government argues that the molestation evidence has probative value since it shows Defendant's "knowing and intentional

Case 2:04-cr-00441-GEB Document 31 Filed 08/31/05 Page 7 of 8

possession and receipt of child pornography." (Notice at 6.)
However, the evidence that DOE states Defendant showed DOE child
pornography and the evidence that Kim observed Defendant looking at
child pornography on a computer, and the communications Defendant had
with each of these individuals on those occasions, is sufficient
substitute evidence on the proposition the government seeks to
establish on Defendant's knowledge.⁴

The government also argues that the evidence has significant probative value on Kim's motive in taking the computers and DOE to the Sheriff's Department immediately upon learning about the molestations. But Defendant's opposition proposes an alternative way for the government to explain why Kim gave the computers to the Sheriff's Department; specifically, that "she believed that there might be images of child pornography on the computers" because she previously saw Defendant looking at child pornography on a computer. (Def.'s Opp'n at 6.) Thus, the essence of Defendant's position is that instead of the government offering the molestation evidence to explain Kim's motive, the government could introduce, as substituted evidence, that Kim took the computers and DOE to the Sheriff's Department as a result of information that DOE told Kim and based upon Kim's previous observation of Defendant's use of a computer. This substituted evidentiary approach is sufficient on the proposition the government seeks to establish on Kim's motive.

Furthermore, Defendant has construed the government's Rule

27

28

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

²⁵²⁶

The government also contends that the molestation evidence establishes Defendant's intent. However, the indicted offenses require the government to prove Defendant knowingly possessed and/or received child pornography; therefore, Defendant's intent is not a material issue in this case.

404(b) proffer as also arguing that the evidence is probative on Defendant's motive to possess and receive child pornography. Although a logical inference can be drawn from the molestation evidence that Defendant has a sexual interest in children and therefore was motivated to have knowingly possessed and received child pornography, the probative value of this Rule 404(b) proposition is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, in light of the indicted offenses.⁵

For all the stated reasons, the molestation evidence is not admissible in the government's case-in-chief on the proffered Rule 404(b) propositions. Therefore, the Notice is granted and denied in part.

Lastly, the government moves in limine for a ruling that precludes Defendant from making any reference to the District Attorney's Office's decision not to file child molestation charges against Defendant. However, it has not been shown that this issue is ripe for review in light of the above ruling.

Dated: August 31, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr. GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. United States District Judge

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

The probative value of this evidentiary proposition is balanced against the risk that the jury could use this evidence for "something other than its persuasive weight," Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d at 956, by using it as propensity evidence. <u>See</u>
<u>Heidebur</u>, 122 F.3d at 581 (stating that the court could not "see any way in which the defendant's abuse of his stepdaughter [was] probative of his knowing possession of [child pornography], other than by establishing a propensity for these kinds of crimes.").